Tuesday, March 31, 2015
Gotz speech in Dresden Feb 9, 2015
Obviously
Germany is experiencing the same Left Lunacy take over we are. No wonder Merckl is just a friendly face appearing to respect The USA. She respects Obama. The same climate of the world exists now as it did during the Communists Brazen path of destruction and Hitler committing atrocities in Germany. German voices are censored, except for a rare speech like this one, subtitled, and only viewed by a several few. Rethink the plane crash by the co-pilot for Germanywings that went down in the French alps. All terrorists are mentally ill... Think about a certain leader of a once "free" world. His agenda is the same as IRAN's using all enemy forces he can - Death to America
Death to the Western way of life. Communism under an iron fist, with more than half our population exterminated by multiple means. It's no joke, and the wars will not be between countries, as in every Western Cultured Country is under attack, it will be those with information-comprehension and common sense who will rise up and fight against the subversive, brutal corrupt despicable power drunk money hungry gluttons in power. THE PEOPLE WILL PREVAIL, NO DOUBT. Get together with all on the Right, the Conservatives like this guy brave enough to speak out. It will be a WAR like never before, a multinational war against its own people. FREEDOM REIGNS, and those who try to control, censor, and restrain will end up as vapor swirling down the drain. IT IS like GRAVITY.
Sunday, March 1, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability
http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/chapter/us-power/us-nuclear-weapons-capability/
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability
Assessing the state of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities presents several challenges. First, the U.S. has elected to maintain the weapons—based on designs from the 1970s—that were in the stockpile when the Cold War ended rather than develop new weapons. Second, detailed data about the readiness of nuclear forces, their capabilities, and weapon reliability are not publicly available, and this makes analysis difficult. Third, the U.S. nuclear enterprise is comprised of many components, some of which are also involved in supporting conventional missions. For example, bombers do not fly with nuclear weapons today as they routinely did during the Cold War (although they are capable of doing so again if the decision should ever be made to resume this practice). Also, the U.S. National Nuclear Laboratories perform a variety of functions related to nuclear nonproliferation, medical research, and nuclear detection, among many others, as opposed to focusing solely on the nuclear weapons mission.
Thus, assessing the extent to which any one piece of the nuclear enterprise is sufficiently funded, focused, and effective with regard to the nuclear mission is problematic.
The second important factor is flexibility and resilience of the nuclear weapons complex that underpins the U.S. nuclear deterrent. If the U.S. detects a game-changing nuclear weapons development in another country, the capability of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex to adjust would be of concern.
The U.S. does maintain an inactive stockpile that includes near-term hedge warheads that can be put back into operational status within six to 24 months.1 Extended hedge warheads can be made ready within 24 to 60 months.2 The U.S. preserves some of this upload capability on its strategic delivery vehicles. For example, the U.S. Minuteman III ICBM can carry up to three nuclear warheads, though it is currently deployed with only one.3
Presidential Decision Directive-15 (PDD-15) requires the U.S. to maintain the ability to conduct a nuclear test within 24 to 36 months of a presidential decision to do so.4 However, successive governmental reports have found continued deterioration of technical and diagnostics equipment and an inability of the National Nuclear Laboratories to fill technical positions supporting nuclear testing readiness.5
The National Nuclear Laboratories are beset by talent and recruitment challenges of their own. Thomas D’Agostino, former Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), stated that in about five years, the United States will not have a single active engineer who had “a key hand in the design of a warhead that’s in the existing stockpile and who was responsible for that particular design when it was tested back in the early 1990s.”6 This is a significant problem because for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, the U.S. will have to rely on the scientific judgment of people who were not directly involved in nuclear tests of weapons that they had designed and developed and were certifying. It is unclear how much of the existing inactive stockpile will go through the life extension program. Hence, our ability to reconstitute nuclear forces will probably decline with the passage of time.
The uncertainty regarding the funding and direction of the nuclear weapons complex is one of the factors that complicate the National Laboratories’ efforts to attract and maintain young talent. The shift of focus away from the nuclear mission after the end of the Cold War caused the National Laboratories to lose their sense of purpose and to feel compelled to reorient their mission focus and change their relationship with the government. The NNSA was supposed to address these problems, but it has largely failed in this task, partly because “the relationship with the NNSA and the National security labs appears to be broken.”7
In 1999, the Commission on Maintaining U.S. Nuclear Weapons Expertise concluded that 34 percent of the employees supplying critical skills to the weapons program were more than 50 years old. The number increased to 40 percent in 2009.8 This is more than the average in the U.S. high-technology industry.9 In 2012, a number of employees of the Los Alamos National Laboratory were laid off in anticipation of a $300 million shortfall.10 The lack of resources is undermining the morale of the workforce.
The third important indication of the health of the overall force is the readiness of forces that actually operate U.S. nuclear systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force, which currently operates two of the three legs of the nuclear triad, has faced significant challenges regarding its operation of U.S. nuclear forces. In 2006, the Air Force mistakenly shipped ICBM components to Taiwan.11 A year later, the Air Force transported nuclear-armed cruise missiles without authorization (or apparently even awareness that it was doing so) across the U.S.12 These serious incidents led to the establishment of a Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, which found that “there has been an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force’s commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until very recently, little has been done to reverse it” and that “the readiness of forces assigned the nuclear mission has seriously eroded.”13
Following these incidents, the Air Force instituted broad changes to improve oversight and management of the nuclear mission and inventory of nuclear weapons, including creating the Global Strike Command to organize, train, and equip intercontinental-range ballistic missile and nuclear-capable bomber crews as well as other personnel to fulfill a nuclear mission and implement a stringent inspections regime.
The U.S. government currently uses two metrics to evaluate the Department of Defense’s Strategic Objective of “Maintain[ing] a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the U.S. and on our allies and partners.”14 They are:
“[The] Number of formal Department of Defense-led meetings with international partners to reaffirm U.S. commitments to extended deterrence” and
“[The] Passing percentage rate for Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections (DNSIs).”15
In the first category, the Department of Defense exceeded its goals in FY 2011, FY 2012, and FY 2013. In the second category, passing percentage rates were 71 percent in FY 2008, 77 percent in FY 2009, 73 percent in FY 2010, 85.7 percent in FY 2011, 100 percent in FY 2012, and 91.7 percent in FY 2013, with the target being 100 percent. While these indicate an improved trend, the Air Force is currently undergoing a major review following a string of additional missteps in 2013 and 2014.16
This calls the credibility and relevance of the metrics into question. It is also not clear how the number of meetings contributes to affirming the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence absent evaluation of capabilities and requirements that allies consider necessary for assurance.
Fiscal uncertainty and a steady decline in resources for the nuclear weapons enterprise have negatively affected U.S. nuclear weapons readiness. Admiral C. D. Haney, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), recently testified that “[i]n recent years the percentage of spending on nuclear forces has gradually declined to only 2.5% of total DOD spending in 2013—a figure near historic lows,”17 although he also stated that he fully believes STRATCOM “remains capable and ready to meet our assigned missions.”
Admiral Haney went on to note that the sequestration-level reductions in FY 2013 had negatively affected STRATCOM’s readiness and had the potential to further affect U.S. capabilities in the future. While he noted that it was impossible to tell just what effects sequestration would have, he observed that the existing freeze on hiring new personnel and furlough of the workforce during the summer of 2013 had diminished the human capacity needed, resulting in a lessening of STRATCOM’s readiness through lack of research and development, modernization, and know-how.
Implications for U.S. National Security
U.S. nuclear forces are not designed to shield the nation from all types of attacks from all adversaries. They are designed to deter large-scale attacks, including nuclear attacks, against the U.S. homeland, forward-deployed troops, and allies.
In addition, U.S. nuclear forces have played an important role in the global nonproliferation regime. U.S. assurances to NATO, Japan, and South Korea have led these allies either to keep the number of their nuclear weapons lower than otherwise would be the case (France, the U.K) or to forgo their development and deployment altogether. North Korea has proven that a country with very limited intellectual and financial resources can develop a nuclear weapon if it decides to do so. This makes U.S. nuclear assurances for advanced industrial nations ever more important.
Certain negative trends could undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence if problems are not addressed. From an aging nuclear weapons infrastructure and workforce, to the need to recapitalize all three legs of the nuclear triad, to the need to conduct life extension programs while maintaining a self-imposed nuclear weapons test moratorium, to limiting the spread of nuclear know-how and the means to deliver nuclear weapons, to adversaries who are modernizing their nuclear forces, there is no shortage of challenges on the horizon.
Deterrence is a complex interplay between one’s conventional and nuclear forces and the beliefs of both allies and adversaries that one will use these forces to protect allies and defend both one’s own interests and their interests. The requirements of deterrence and warfighting may be quite different and thus should be considered within their own context and then balanced against each other to ensure that the U.S. nuclear portfolio is structured in capacity, capability, variety, and readiness to meet both types of demands. In addition, military requirements and specifications for nuclear weapons might be different depending on different circumstances and who one wants to deter from doing what.
Due to the complex interplay between policy, actions that states take in international relations, and other actors’ perceptions of the world around them, it is quite possible that one might never know precisely when deterrence became less credible. Nuclear weapons capabilities take years to develop, and the infrastructure supporting them takes years to deteriorate. But we can be reasonably certain that a robust, well-resourced, focused, and reliable nuclear enterprise is more likely to sustain its deterrent value than is a weakened, unfocused, and questionable one
http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/chapter/us-power/us-nuclear-weapons-capability/
Putin threatens to use nuclear warheads against Ukraine, EU
http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/02/08/putin-threatens-to-use-nuclear-warheads-against-ukraine-eu/
The first one is to prevent the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. Those and other European politicians are supported by various ‘experts’ and non-Ukrainian media who claim Ukrainians would use the weapons to either escalate the crisis (i.e. to bomb Russia), would not know how to use them or have an army that is not capable of fighting. Strange enough, the Ukrainian army has been able to prevent a break-through of the Russian army on the front in the Russian January 2015 campaign. But it is easy to ignore this if we have “local rebels” or “Russian-backed separatists” (now more popular) that do the fighting or even a “civil war”. Preventing weapon deliveries to Ukraine at this stage is irresponsible and sets the stage for war in EU and NATO countries.
The second reason is that the Russian president has deployed the ballistic missile system Iskander in Kaliningrad and on Crimea. This system is capable of launching nuclear warheads. Informnapalm reports several sources provided information the Russian president warned of using them ahead of US Secretary of State Kerry’s visit in Kyiv on 5 February 2015. See the possible range on the following graph:
This threat reportedly was directed against Ukraine – but it is also a direct threat against the EU (see graph on the deployment of all Russian Iskanders possible to reach EU countries). The most powerful EU leaders allow themselves to be harassed and still talk to a man that never has kept his promises. In spring/summer 2014, he threatened to invade Ukraine – Ukraine was invaded besides all talks and agreements. Now, he threatens to use Iskander missiles. There are talks and agreements. He won’t stick to talks and agreements, and if he finds it necessary, he will use them.
Talks do not prevent action.
Action prevents action.
Arm Ukraine now.
Putin threatens to use nuclear warheads against Ukraine, EU
Article by: Nicole Gallina
There are two reasons why Germany’s Merkel and France’s Hollande humiliated themselves in Moscow.The first one is to prevent the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. Those and other European politicians are supported by various ‘experts’ and non-Ukrainian media who claim Ukrainians would use the weapons to either escalate the crisis (i.e. to bomb Russia), would not know how to use them or have an army that is not capable of fighting. Strange enough, the Ukrainian army has been able to prevent a break-through of the Russian army on the front in the Russian January 2015 campaign. But it is easy to ignore this if we have “local rebels” or “Russian-backed separatists” (now more popular) that do the fighting or even a “civil war”. Preventing weapon deliveries to Ukraine at this stage is irresponsible and sets the stage for war in EU and NATO countries.
The second reason is that the Russian president has deployed the ballistic missile system Iskander in Kaliningrad and on Crimea. This system is capable of launching nuclear warheads. Informnapalm reports several sources provided information the Russian president warned of using them ahead of US Secretary of State Kerry’s visit in Kyiv on 5 February 2015. See the possible range on the following graph:
Image by Informnapalm.org
This threat reportedly was directed against Ukraine – but it is also a direct threat against the EU (see graph on the deployment of all Russian Iskanders possible to reach EU countries). The most powerful EU leaders allow themselves to be harassed and still talk to a man that never has kept his promises. In spring/summer 2014, he threatened to invade Ukraine – Ukraine was invaded besides all talks and agreements. Now, he threatens to use Iskander missiles. There are talks and agreements. He won’t stick to talks and agreements, and if he finds it necessary, he will use them.
Talks do not prevent action.
Action prevents action.
Arm Ukraine now.
American, British, Polish and Russian Experts Warn that Continued Fighting In Ukraine Could Lead to Nuclear War
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/02/american-british-polish-russian-experts-warn-continued-fighting-ukraine-lead-nuclear-war.html
American, British, Polish and Russian Experts Warn that Continued Fighting In Ukraine Could Lead to Nuclear War
The Stakes Are Too High Not to Negotiate Peace
Former Soviet leader and Nobel prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev warned that the battle in Ukraine could result in a nuclear war:“A war of this kind would unavoidably lead to a nuclear war,” the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize winner told Der Spiegel news magazine, according to excerpts released on Friday.One of America’s top experts on Russia – Steven Cohen – has warned that failure to negotiate a peace treaty in Ukraine could lead to nuclear war.
“We won’t survive the coming years if someone loses their nerve in this overheated situation,” added Gorbachev, 83. “This is not something I’m saying thoughtlessly. I am extremely concerned.”
Steven Starr – a nuclear arms expert and senior scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility – warns that proposed U.S. legislation would be a direct path towards nuclear war with Russia.
Former Russian advisor to Margret Thatcher John Bowne said yesterday:
I think it is dire particularly because President Obama has had the wrong end of the stick, and he follows a strategic mistake. When President Reagan and Secretary of State Gorbachev, with the assistance of Margret Thatcher, achieved an end to the cold war, in other words, the colder part of Second World War in the mid 1980’s, it was agreed, if not in writing but tacitly, that neither side would try to poach on the old buffer states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. From the Russian point of view, they see a number of countries have voted quite democratically, like Poland, to go into the European Union and be associated with NATO and things like that. They have also seen activity by the secret services of the West, most notably the CIA in the Ukraine, to persuade them to go. This has angered the Russians, and when you come to the Ukraine and Crimea, you are treading on vital interests of Russia. It is very similar to the situation in October of 1962, when Khrushchev of the Soviet Union decided to put intercontinental ballistic missiles in Cuba, right in the soft underbelly of the United States, threating the vital interests of the United States. In that confrontation, President Kennedy had to win even if it meant nuclear war. He had to win that battle. In this case, we have the West interfering in the soft underbelly of Russia, notably the Ukraine and in Crimea. This threatens the vital interest of Russia like a warm water port with access to the Eastern Mediterranean, which they have sought for 200 years. Putin, who enjoys 80 percent domestic support, has to win even if it means going to war.Former Polish president – and famed anti-communist activist – Lech Walesa also warned that the U.S. and Nato’s arming of Ukraine could lead to a nuclear war.
***
This would have a very high risk of slipping into nuclear war. Russia has enormous ground forces, and they are very up to date. Putin has updated the Russian armed forces tremendously. They have very sophisticated rocket weapons, and if we saw massive numbers of our troops being slaughtered, maybe we would be the first to press the nuclear button. . . . So, this is a desperate situation.
Leading American political activist Noam Chomsky agrees.
Australian doctor and Nobel prize winner Helen Caldicott warns:
The expansion of NATO to Russia’s borders is “very, very dangerous,” Caldicott said. “There is no way a war between the United States and Russia could start and not go nuclear. … The United States and Russia have enormous stockpiles of these weapons. Together they have 94 percent of all the 16,300 nuclear weapons in the world.”
“We are in a very fallible, very dangerous situation operated by mere mortals,” she warned. “The nuclear weapons, are sitting there, thousands of them. They are ready to be used.”
***
Caldicott strongly criticized Obama administration policymakers for their actions in forward positioning U.S. and NATO military units in countries of Eastern Europe in response to Russian support of breakaway separatists in the provinces of eastern Ukraine. On –, the U.S. government announced the deployment of the Ironhorse Brigade, an elite armored cavalry unit of the U.S. Army to the former Soviet republics of Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia, along the historic invasion route from the West to St. Petersburg.And see this, this, this, this, this and this.
“Do they really want a nuclear war with Russia?” she asked “The only war that you can have with Russia is a nuclear war. … You don’t provoke paranoid countries armed with nuclear weapons.”
Indeed, Eric Zuesse says that the risks are so high – and the American leaders so reckless – that Russia is preparing for an expected nuclear attack by the U.S.
Postscript: In the 1987 book To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon’s Secret War Plans, one of the world’s leading physicists – Michio Kaku – revealed declassified plans for the U.S. to launch a first-strike nuclear war against Russia. The forward was written by the former Attorney General of the United States, Ramsey Clarke.
In Towards a World War III Scenario, Michel Chossudovsky documents that the U.S. is so enamored with nuclear weapons that it has authorized low-level field commanders to use them in the heat of battle in their sole discretion … without any approval from civilian leaders.
May cooler heads prevail …
S.269 - Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015114th Congress (2015-2016)
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/269/text
S.269 - Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015114th Congress (2015-2016) |
Bill
| Sponsor: | Sen. Kirk, Mark Steven [R-IL] (Introduced 01/27/2015) |
|---|---|
| Committees: | Senate - Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs |
| Latest Action: | 01/27/2015 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. |
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Subject — Policy Area:
- International Affairs
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Text: S.269 — 114th Congress (2015-2016)All Bill Information (Except Text)
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Introduced in Senate (01/27/2015)
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[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[S. 269 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
114th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 269
To expand sanctions imposed with respect to Iran and to impose
additional sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
January 27, 2015
Mr. Kirk (for himself, Mr. Menendez, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Schumer, Ms.
Ayotte, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Coats, Mr. Peters, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Manchin,
Mr. Graham, Mr. Donnelly, Mr. Cruz, Mr. Casey, Mr. Burr, and Mr. Blunt)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To expand sanctions imposed with respect to Iran and to impose
additional sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Weapon
Free Iran Act of 2015''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
TITLE I--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGREEMENTS WITH, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RELIEF PROVIDED TO, IRAN
Sec. 101. Transmission to Congress of agreements with Iran and
assessment reports with respect to such
agreements.
Sec. 102. Period for review by Congress of long-term comprehensive
solution.
TITLE II--EXPANSION AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
Sec. 201. Effective dates for staged imposition of sanctions if long-
term comprehensive solution not reached.
Sec. 202. Termination of suspension of sanctions.
Sec. 203. Applicability of sanctions with respect to petroleum
transactions.
Sec. 204. Ineligibility for exception to certain sanctions for
countries that do not reduce purchases of
petroleum from Iran or of Iranian origin to
a de minimis level.
Sec. 205. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect
to, certain Iranian individuals.
Sec. 206. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions in
foreign currencies with or for certain
sanctioned persons.
Sec. 207. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ports, special
economic zones, and strategic sectors of
Iran.
Sec. 208. Waiver of sanctions.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Exception for Afghanistan reconstruction.
Sec. 302. Exception for import restrictions.
Sec. 303. Applicability to certain intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Applicability to certain natural gas projects.
Sec. 305. Rule of construction with respect to the use of force against
Iran.
Sec. 306. Sense of Congress on increased staffing for agencies involved
in the implementation and enforcement of
sanctions against Iran.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning given
that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(2) Joint plan of action.--The term ``Joint Plan of
Action''--
(A) means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at
Geneva November 24, 2013, by Iran and the P5-plus-1
countries; and
(B) includes all implementing materials and
agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action,
including the technical understandings reached on
January 12, 2014, the extension agreed to on July 19,
2014, the extension agreed to on November 24, 2014, and
any extension that is agreed to on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act and is transmitted to the
appropriate congressional committees pursuant to
section 101.
(3) Long-term comprehensive solution.--The term ``long-term
comprehensive solution'' means any comprehensive agreement,
including a framework agreement or political agreement,
regarding the nuclear program of Iran as described in the Joint
Plan of Action, without regard to whether or not one or more
countries other than the United States and Iran are parties to
the agreement, and all implementing materials and technical
understandings related to that comprehensive agreement.
(4) P5-plus-1 countries.--The term ``P5-plus-1 countries''
means the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the
People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is the policy of the United States that the
Government of Iran will not be allowed to develop or otherwise
acquire a nuclear weapon capability;
(2) all instruments of power and influence of the United
States should remain on the table to prevent the Government of
Iran from developing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon
capability;
(3) a long-term comprehensive solution with Iran will be
most sustainable over the long term if the President consults
and coordinates closely with Congress to implement a strategy
that decisively ends any nuclear threat from Iran;
(4) the Government of Iran does not have an absolute or
inherent right to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and
technologies under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,
1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred
to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'');
(5) the goal of international negotiations with Iran, led
by the United States, should be to conclude a long-term
comprehensive solution with parameters that will--
(A) reverse the development of Iran's illicit
nuclear infrastructure, including enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities and facilities, the heavy
water reactor and production plant at Arak, and any
nuclear weapon components and technology, such that
Iran is precluded from a nuclear breakout capability
and prevented from pursuing both uranium and plutonium
pathways to a nuclear weapon;
(B) bring Iran into compliance with all United
Nations Security Council resolutions related to Iran's
nuclear program, including Resolutions 1696 (2006),
1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and
1929 (2010), with a view toward bringing to a
satisfactory conclusion the Security Council's
consideration of matters relating to the nuclear
program of Iran;
(C) resolve all issues of past and present concern
with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including
possible military dimensions of the nuclear program of
Iran, and give inspectors access to personnel,
documents, and facilities involved, at any point, with
nuclear or nuclear weapons-related activities of Iran;
(D) permit on-site and short-notice inspection,
verification, and monitoring of all declared and
suspect facilities in Iran, including installation and
use of any compliance verification equipment requested
by the International Atomic Energy Agency, such that
any effort by Iran to produce a nuclear weapon will be
quickly detected;
(E) require that Iran fully implement and comply
with--
(i) the Agreement between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly
referred to as the ``Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement'');
(ii) modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements to the Agreement between Iran and
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons; and
(iii) ratification and implementation of
the Protocol Additional to the Agreement
between Iran and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Vienna December 18, 2003 (commonly referred to
as the ``Additional Protocol''); and
(F) require that Iran implement measures in
addition to the Additional Protocol that include
verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency
of Iran's centrifuge research, development, and
manufacturing facilities, including raw materials and
components, and Iran's uranium mines, mills, and
processing facilities;
(6) the United States should continue to impose sanctions
on the Government of Iran and its proxies for their continuing
sponsorship of terrorism;
(7) the United States should continue to impose sanctions
on the Government of Iran and Iranian persons for--
(A) ongoing abuses of human rights; and
(B) actions in support of the regime of Bashar al-
Assad in Syria; and
(8) the United States should continue to impose sanctions
on the Government of Iran and other governments and persons for
the procurement, sale, or transfer of technology, services, or
goods that support the development or acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction or the means of delivery of those weapons.
TITLE I--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGREEMENTS WITH, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RELIEF PROVIDED TO, IRAN
SEC. 101. TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN AND
ASSESSMENT REPORTS WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AGREEMENTS.
(a) Transmission of Agreements.--Not later than 5 days after
entering into a long-term comprehensive solution or any agreement to
extend the Joint Plan of Action entered into after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees--
(1) the text of the agreement;
(2) a verification assessment report of the Secretary of
State prepared under subsection (b) with respect to the
agreement; and
(3) an economic sanctions relief assessment report of the
Secretary of the Treasury prepared under subsection (c) with
respect to the agreement.
(b) Verification Assessment Report.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
prepare, with respect to each agreement described in subsection
(a), a report assessing the extent to which the Secretary will
be able to verify that Iran is complying with its obligations
under the agreement.
(2) Assumptions.--In preparing a report under paragraph (1)
with respect to an agreement described in subsection (a), the
Secretary shall assume that Iran could--
(A) use all measures not expressly prohibited by
the agreement to conceal activities that violate its
obligations under the agreement; and
(B) alter or deviate from standard practices in
order to impede efforts to verify that Iran is
complying with those obligations.
(c) Economic Sanctions Relief Assessment Report.--The Secretary of
the Treasury shall, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence, prepare, with respect to each agreement described in
subsection (a), a report assessing the extent to which the economy of
Iran--
(1) has, as of the date of the report, directly and
indirectly benefited from sanctions relief pursuant to the
Joint Plan of Action; and
(2) is likely, over the course of the agreement, to
directly and indirectly benefit from proposed sanctions relief,
including enhanced trade and market opportunities, pursuant to
the agreement.
(d) Form of Reports.--Each report under subsection (b) or (c) shall
be transmitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
5 things to know about the U.S.-Iran nuclear talks
Oren Dorell, USA TODAY Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says he'll use Tuesday's speech before a joint session of Congress to speak out against an emerging nuclear deal between Iran and major powers that include the United States.
Here are five things to know about the Iran nuclear talks:
1. What are the U.S. and Iran trying to accomplish?
The United States wants to ensure Iran's nuclear program is just for peaceful civilian purposes, with enough assurances and monitoring to prevent it from producing high-grade fuel for a nuclear bomb. Iran, an oil-rich nation, says it wants to produce its own nuclear fuel for domestic energy, scientific and medical purposes. It has said it will accept certain limits to a fuel production program it considers its sovereign right, in return for the lifting of onerous international sanctions that have crippled its economy.
2. What are main sticking points to a deal?
Iran wants an industrial-scale nuclear fuel production program with 190,000 centrifuges. The U.S. wants the current number of machines —19,000 with 10,000 running — reduced to under 5,000.
The two sides also disagree on the duration of a comprehensive deal, when all sanctions would be lifted and whether Iran would be free to install as many fuel production machines as it wants. Iran has said the agreement should last fewer than 10 years, while the Obama administration has said 20. Iran wants most sanctions lifted immediately, while the U.S. wants most lifted when the deal expires.
3. Why is Netanyahu so adamantly against an emerging deal?
President Obama has pledged to never let Iran obtain nuclear weapons. But he has been willing to allow Iran to produce its own nuclear fuel through a process that can be used for civilian or military purposes. Netanyahu sees a potential Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat to nearby Israel, so he worries that the any deal allowing Iran to produce nuclear fuel poses the risk Iran will be able to create a secret weapons program.
4. What are the outlines of a potential deal?
Iran, the U.S. and five other world powers — Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia — appear to have agreed on the number of centrifuges Iran can operate and on a reconfigured Iranian reactor that produces less plutonium, another fuel for a bomb. They also seem to have agreed to provide international inspectors unprecedented access to Iranian nuclear sites to assure the nuclear program remains peaceful. The deal is likely to last 10 and 20 years. Some sanctions will be lifted immediately; others will be lifted later.
5. What role is Congress playing?
Congressional Democrats gave Obama a March 24 deadline to reach a framework agreement. At that point, they will join Republican colleagues to consider increasing sanctions on Iran. Those favoring tougher sanctions say they are needed to prod Iran into an acceptable accord, but Obama says they would derail the talks. Obama has asked Congress to hold off on new sanctions until after the deadline for a comprehensive agreement in June. Many in the Republican-led Congress also want a say in approving the final deal. Removing many sanctions on Iran would require a vote by Congress.
The Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015
http://www.aipac.org/learn/legislative-agenda/agenda-display?agendaid={E9465F79-9380-4A00-BAA9-18DB524F23C8}
The Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015
After a year of negotiations and generous offers by the P5+1, Iran
has not demonstrated a willingness to give up the capability to develop
nuclear weapons. Tough pressure brought Iran to negotiations and
additional pressure will strengthen America’s bargaining position. Sens.
Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) have introduced the Nuclear
Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015 to support American diplomatic efforts by
providing the president authority to impose additional sanctions on Iran
if nuclear negotiations fail to achieve a final agreement. Urge your
senators to support this bipartisan crucial legislation.
The legislation puts in place sanctions that will go into effect if Iran and the P5+1 do not reach an agreement under which Tehran clearly gives up the option of developing nuclear weapons. The legislation clearly complies with President Barack Obama's commitment that the United States would impose no new sanctions during the course of negotiations with Iran.
The legislation increases congressional oversight of Iran nuclear negotiations by requiring the president to formally submit to Congress the text of any final agreement with Iran, as well as a verification assessment report, within five days of reaching a final agreement. Congress would have the opportunity to review any agreement for 30 legislative days.
If there is no final agreement by July 6, 2015, the bill re-imposes sanctions waived against Iran during the interim agreement. After July 6, the bill imposes an escalating series of new sanctions against Iran each month starting in August and ending in December. The bill provides the president with authority to waive new sanctions if he feels it necessary in order to conclude a comprehensive agreement with Iran.
The legislation puts in place sanctions that will go into effect if Iran and the P5+1 do not reach an agreement under which Tehran clearly gives up the option of developing nuclear weapons. The legislation clearly complies with President Barack Obama's commitment that the United States would impose no new sanctions during the course of negotiations with Iran.
The legislation increases congressional oversight of Iran nuclear negotiations by requiring the president to formally submit to Congress the text of any final agreement with Iran, as well as a verification assessment report, within five days of reaching a final agreement. Congress would have the opportunity to review any agreement for 30 legislative days.
If there is no final agreement by July 6, 2015, the bill re-imposes sanctions waived against Iran during the interim agreement. After July 6, the bill imposes an escalating series of new sanctions against Iran each month starting in August and ending in December. The bill provides the president with authority to waive new sanctions if he feels it necessary in order to conclude a comprehensive agreement with Iran.
Negotiating A Final Deal with Iran
Key Points
-
Diplomacy Must be Backed by Pressure
Tough pressure brought Iran to negotiations and additional pressure will strengthen America’s bargaining position. It is now essential that Congress take up new sanctions legislation to let Tehran know that it will face much more severe pressure if it does not clearly give up the option of developing nuclear weapons.
-
Iran Refuses to Compromise
After a year of negotiations, and generous offers by the P5+1, Iran has not demonstrated a willingness to give up the capability to develop nuclear weapons. -
A Deal Must Include Dismantlement
The United States must insist that any final nuclear agreement with Iran include the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure such that it is left without a uranium or plutonium pathway to a nuclear weapon. -
America Must Stand with Israel
The United States must back Israel if it feels compelled in its own legitimate self-defense to take military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
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Nuclear Program News (ABC)
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Nuclear Program News
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